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1 Introduction
Over the past months there has been a steady increase in international anti-trade rhetoric around
the world. In fact, already after the dramatic collapse of international trade in the wake of the
financial crisis in 2007/08, there was a common fear that governments may respond to domestic
economic challenges by increasing tariffs and other trade barriers to protect their economies. Such
an uncoordinated trade policy would have possibly satisfied domestic interests in the short run as
a symbolic reaction but at the same time it would have resulted in an even stronger slow-down in
economic growth. One big difference in how countries reacted to the recent global financial crisis
of the 21st century in contrast to the crises of the last century has been a stronger cooperation in
international trade policies under the shelter of the WTO that has successfully prohibited a surge in
border tariffs.
Figure 1: Average Most-Favoured-Nation Tariffs Accross Different Regions
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Figure 1 illustrates for different regions how average Most-Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs have de-
veloped over the past 15 years within the World Trade Organization (WTO) member states. While
the level of average tariffs across different regions still differs substantially, tariffs have been on the
decline in all regions. Hence, despite the increasing domestic economic challenges across the world,
one is tempted to conclude, that policy makers have resisted to increase trade protection.
At the same time Figure 2 illustrates how global merchandise trade has developed over the past
decades. While international trade was steadily growing until 2007, the succeeding years are char-
acterized by a slowdown and even a reversal in global trade.
How can this trade pattern be explained with the finding that customs duties over the past years
have been declining? Is it possible, that trade protection has been on the rise not in form of tariffs
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but based on alternative trade restricting measures which are probably not regulated within the
WTO rules? Furthermore, is there a justification for the rising criticism by policy makers lead by
the newly elected US administration: namely, that an increasing number of countries is applying
protective trade policies that necessitates counter action to recreate a level playing field with faire
trade?
Clearly, the reasons which have lead to a global trade slowdown are manifold. The related literature
traces the slowdown back to e.g. a temporary reduction of trade in commodities due to a higher
self-sufficiency in energy consumption. Moreover, the special role of China in the last decade: after
a period of strong export based growth not only has China’s import demand for commodities been
falling, but the country has been also importing a smaller volume of manufactured goods, resulting
in a lower global trade. Finally, the change in global value chains, with multinational enterprises
reducing their new foundation of offshore companies, may also contributed to a slowdown of cross-
border trade growth. While the questions of which forces and to what extend shape global trade
flow development itself is an important and interesting questions, the focus of this study is put on
a very particular related aspect.
Figure 2: Global Merchandise Trade Development
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The purpose of the underlying study is to shed light on the latter questions by illustrating how trade
protection in form of non-tariff barriers has emerged over the past years. A major focus is put on
illustrating what type of non-tariff barriers have been implemented by policy makers to reduce import
competition. Moreover, a new contribution of the underlying study is the empirical evaluation of
how newly implemented non-tariff barriers impact international trade.
Accordingly, the first part of this study provides a detailed descriptive analysis of applied non-tariff
barriers to assess the role of non-tariff barriers in global protectionism. The analysis is based on
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recently released data from the Global Trade Alert (GTA) lately documented by Evenett and Fritz
(2017). It focuses on different types of non-tariff barriers as well as differences across countries and
sectors. The second part of this study focuses on the econometric analysis of non-tariff barriers.
Based on a structural gravity model it is illustrated how non-tariff barriers have shaped international
trade.
2 Major Results of the Analysis
Protectionism in international trade has been on the rise
Customs duties have not been used in a significant manner to protect domestic markets from foreign
competition since the financial crisis in 2008. Instead, the presented GTA data illustrates a strong
increase in non-tariff barriers that aim at reducing imports. Since 2009, only 20% of all implemented
protectionist interventions can be attributed to an increase in tariffs. In contrast, non-tariff barriers
accounted for on average 55% of all implemented protectionist interventions. The usage of non-tariff
barriers increased steadily relative to trade defense measures. While in 2010 only 54% of all protec-
tionist interventions were non-tariff barriers the usage of non-tariff barriers increased to 61% in 2016.
High income countries increasingly use non-tariff barriers
The usage of non-tariff barriers is highly correlated with the income level of an economy. High
income countries appear to use non-tariff barriers more often than low or middle income countries.
Despite the difference in the number of non-tariff barriers implemented, the relative importance
of non-tariff barriers compared to traditional trade defense measures or tariff increases also varies
across income levels. The implementation of non-tariff barriers substantially varies across countries.
The United States implemented by far the largest number of non-tariff barriers. With close to 800
non-tariff barriers the US government implemented twice as much protectionist policies as the Indian
government, which ranks second. The two BRICS economies, India and Russia rank second and third
among the countries that implemented the most non-tariff barriers, with 310 and 204 implemented
measures, respectively. Larger European economies like Germany, the United Kingdom and France
implemented between 50 and 100 non-tariff barriers, which is only about one tenth of the amount
of non-tariff barriers implemented by the United States.
Subsidies and state aid measures are increasingly applied
Subsidies and state aid measures make up the largest number of implemented non-tariff barriers in
the considered database. These measures are mainly driven by the extensive provision of financial
grants provided to domestic companies that discriminate against foreign competitors. Over 500
such financial grants have been provided in the period between 2009 and 2017. Other important
subsidies and state aid instruments have been state loans, bailouts and taxes or social-insurance
3
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reliefs. Localisation requirements in public procurement are the second most often applied non-tariff
barriers, with over 360 implemented restrictions.
Non-tariff barriers significantly reduce trade
Not only have non-tariff barriers been increasingly applied as trade restricting measures, but they
also have had a significant import reducing effect. On average bilateral imports decrease in response
to the implementation of at least one non-tariff barrier by 12%. Similarly, on average yearly-bilateral
trade decrease by around 11%, if at least one trade defense measure is implemented. However,
non-tariff barriers are used substantially more often than trade defense measures, which include
anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures.
Trade reducing effect of non-tariff barriers is highly heterogeneous
The effect of non-tariff barriers on imports turns out to be very divers across different industries,
countries with different income levels and individual countries. A main reason for this heterogeneity
can be found in the strong variation on how often and which type of non-tariff barriers are imple-
mented in the different groups.
Non-tariff barriers contributed to the global trade slowdown
The underlying analysis illustrates that non-tariff barriers may be responsible for about 16% of the
observed global trade slowdown.
Differences of observed non-tariff barriers across data sources
The study illustrates that the identification of non-tariff barriers remains a major challenges. Contrary
to data on non-tariff barriers provided by other sources, the GTA database for example records
only very few Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures.
One reason for this pattern may stem from the fact that other sources like the WTO do not
distinguish between non-tariff barriers and non-tariff measures. Different to non-tariff barriers, non-
tariff measures do not necessarily have a protectionist character, but could also liberalize trade.
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3 Non-Tariff Barriers: Definition and Measurement
Non-tariff barriers are hard to assess. Different to tariffs, which are transparent and accessible via
each countries’ custom authority, non-tariff barriers are often much more hidden. Moreover, there
is no clear-cut definition of non-tariff barriers. In this study we consider any government policy
that potentially leads to a discriminatory treatment of foreign competitors relative to domestic
agents as a non-tariff barrier. We specifically separate the three WTO safeguarding measures: anti-
dumping duties, safeguards and countervailing duties. These temporary trade policy instruments are
collectively referred to as trade defense measures. Our definition thus can include any direct border
controls that do not represent tariff increases, such as quotas, bans or licensing requirements. This
convention also accounts for policies that only indirectly affect trade, such as discriminatory public
procurement and localisation policies or state aid measures.
It has been, in particular, the financial crisis in 2007/08 that triggered a debate about increasing
protectionism, which emphasized the role of non-tariff barriers. This international political but also
academic debate led to multiple data collection initiatives that improved the scarce data provision
of non-tariff barriers.1 One of these initiatives is the GTA database. An initiative of the Centre for
Economic Policy Research (CEPR), which is based in London and coordinated by a research team
in St. Gallen.
The GTA database collects protectionist policies that were implemented worldwide since 2009. In
July 2017 a comprehensive update of the database was released. It covers an outstanding range
of non-tariff barriers, which makes a detailed and up-to-date assessment of implemented non-tariff
barriers possible. Therefore, this study builds on the outstanding new data from the GTA to assess
the role of non-tariff barriers.
The database distinguishes fourty-four different protectionist measures that can affect trade in goods.
These could either be standard trade policies such as tariff increases and trade defense measures
or non-tariff barriers. For each policy intervention the GTA database provides information on a)
which trading partners are likely to be affected, b) which products are targeted and c) the date
of implementation. Typical examples of non-tariff barriers included in the database are state aid
measures, changes in public procurement rules, trading quotas, licensing requirements or trade
finance instruments. Until July 2017, the GTA database recorded more than 6,800 protectionist
interventions. The last intervention added dates back to 1st July 2017 - an increase of the export
tax on crude palm oil by the Malaysian government.2
Different to data collection efforts of the WTO, United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD), the International Trade Center (ITC) and the World Bank, the GTA data
1Examples are the Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS) database, NTM business surveys and the Inte-
grated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) database.
2http://www.globaltradealert.org/latest/state-acts, last accessed: 7.7.2017
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collection does not rely on official government notifications. Instead the GTA researchers system-
atically monitor official government websites and other official sources to depict all policy changes
that potentially affect trade. The set of policies covered is not predefined. Each policy intervention
that is included in the GTA database has to pass a six-step evaluation process. During this process
it is evaluated whether the policy discriminates against foreign exporters to the benefit of domestic
producers.
The GTA database provides simple indicators of whether a protectionist measure is implemented
between two trading partners. This has the advantage that the data is very timely available. A
clear disadvantage is that simple indicators do not reflect the degree of protectionism. State aid,
for example, provided to a specific company is likely to hamper trade to a different degree than a
direct border measures, like e.g. an import ban. However, only measures, which are likely to impose
a significant relative change on the treatment of domestic to foreign agents pass the mentioned
six-step evaluation process. For example a non-binding import quota would not be counted.
As this study aims to assess the average effect of non-tariff barriers on trade, the GTA database has
several other advantages over alternative data sources. Firstly, it clearly distinguishes between dis-
criminatory and non-discriminatory non-tariff measures. The TRAINS database, which is collectively
published by the WTO, UNCTAD, the ITC and the World Bank and one of the largest databases on
non-tariff measures for example does not make this distinction. This leads firstly to multiple entries
regarding SPS standards and TBT measures, which are not necessarily protectionist, but could also
be trade enhancing. Secondly, the definition of non-tariff barriers according to GTA is not restricted
to merely trade policies. The TRAINS database, as well as I-TIP, a database provided by the
WTO, restrict their collection of non-tariff measures to explicit trade policies. According to I-TIP,
non-tariff measures are "defined as the measures subject to monitoring through notification under
GATT-WTO agreements. Measures that are not subject to monitoring are not considered."3 As a
consequence, these databases do not include state aid or bailout measures as non-tariff measures.
Still, it might be that this kind of hidden protectionism plays an increasingly important role for
developed economies. WTO regulations significantly reduced the scope to use standard trade poli-
cies to restrict trade. Furthermore, both TRAINS and I-TIP rely on government notifications only,
which makes underreporting of the actual degree of protectionism likely. The Non-Tariff-Measure
business surveys, which are published by the ITC provide very detailed information on how specific
non-tariff measures affect businesses. However, these surveys are only conducted country-wide and
are therefore not suitable for a cross-country comparison.
The greatest drawbacks of the GTA database are that it only contains information on non-tariff
barriers after 2009. As a consequence, unfortunately a comparison with pre-crisis levels of protec-
tionism is not possible. In addition, its data collection method strongly relies on the transparency of
3http://i-tip.wto.org/goods/Default.aspx. (For a comprehensive list of measures subject to notification, see:
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/33-dnotf_e.htm)
6
Hidden Protectionism ifo Institute
governments publishing their policies online. To illustrate: Saudi-Arabia was listed as the least pro-
tectionist country among the G20 economies in 2015. Only after its state development fund made
information about all loans and financial grants given to domestic companies publicly available, it
jumped to the seventh rank in 2016 (Evenett and Fritz (2016), p.38). Similarly, governments differ
in how they announce policies. As noted by GTA, the US government tends to announce each policy
separately, while European governments tend to announce policies in bundles. This has to be kept
in mind when looking at counts of implemented non-tariff barriers.
It is important to note that the GTA data, which is used in this analysis, cannot provide a compre-
hensive overview of all trade hurdles faced by exporters. As delineated there are many reasons why
still unobserved trade barriers may exist. Nevertheless, the presented data cover the most update
NTB measures on the global scale. An empirical analysis promises to shed light on how NTBs are
shaping international trade.
The study focuses on policy interventions that affect trade in goods only. Policy interventions that
affect the commercial flow of services, labor migration and investment are not considered. All data
in the next section refers to protectionist interventions identified in the GTA database. The dataset
covers 151 countries that implemented protectionist policies between 2009 and 2017.4 In total 214
countries have at least once been affected by a protectionist policy.
4 The Role of Non-Tariff Barriers in Global Protectionism
A core finding of the following chapter is that protectionism is on the rise if non-tariff barriers
are accounted for. According to GTA data, protectionism steadily increased since 2009. In total
more than 5,600 new protectionist policies have been implemented worldwide between January 2009
and July 2017. More than 3,000 of these protectionist policies have been non-tariff barriers. This
increase in the application of non-tariff barriers is a common time trend observed across other data
sources.
4.1 Non-Tariff Barriers as Means to Restrict International Trade
The stock of non-tariff barriers that are currently in force increased since 2009. Over 2,400 non-tariff
barriers that were newly implemented since 2009 were still in force at the end of 2016 (see Figure
3). Only about one third of the non-tariff barriers that were implemented since 2009 have been
temporarily.
Figure 4 and 5 show that tariffs are not the major tool for countries to protect domestic economies.
4The dataset includes only those interventions for which information on potentially affected trading partners were
available. 0.8% observations are excluded as no affected trading partner was identified.
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Figure 3: Number of NTBs Currently in Force (2009-2016)
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Source: Global trade alert database. Note that only non-tariff barriers that were implemented after 2008 are included.
Instead, non-tariff barriers are most often applied. Since 2009, only 20% of all implemented pro-
tectionist interventions can be attributed to an increase in tariffs. In contrast, non-tariff barriers
accounted for on average 55% of the implemented protectionist interventions. The use of non-tariff
barriers increased steadily relative to trade defense measures. While in 2010 only 54% of all pro-
tectionist interventions were non-tariff barriers the usage of non-tariff barriers increased to 61% in
2016. Trade defense measures observed a slight backdrop. In 2009, 30% of all applied protectionist
policies could still be attributed to either anti-dumping duties, safeguards or countervailing duties.
These dropped to only 21% in 2015, while increasing slightly again to 24% in 2016 - mainly driven
by the increasing amount of anti-dumping disputes in industries with over-capacities like the steel
sector or solar panel products.
Looking more specifically on the types of non-tariff barriers applied, it is evident, that financial
grants provided to exporting enterprises are the most often applied non-tariff barrier. Figure 6
shows a ranking of non-tariff barriers, sorted by categories of non-tariff barriers, that were most
often applied between 2009 and mid-2017. Six categories are distinguished: (1) capital controls
and exchange rate policies, (2) export and import policy instruments, (3) subsidies and state aid
measures, (4) public procurement policies (5) localisation policies and (6) other instruments. Table
1 provides an overview of intervention types included in each category. Subsidies and state aid
measures make up for the largest category. Which is mainly driven by the extensive provision of
financial grants provided to domestic companies that discriminate against foreign competitors. Over
500 such financial grants have been provided. Other important subsidies and state aid instruments
8
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Figure 4: Number of New Protectionist Interventions,
by Type (2009-2016)
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Figure 5: Share of NTBs, Tariffs and Trade Defense Measures of All New Protectionist
Interventions (2009-2016)
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have been discriminatory state loans, bailouts and taxes or social-insurance reliefs. That subsidies
and state aid measures make up for the largest category of non-tariff barriers, especially compared
to direct import and export controls underlines the importance of not only considering direct trade
policies, but extending the focus on more hidden protectionism.
The large amount of newly implemented public procurement and localization policies also emphasizes
the increasing importance of indirect trade barriers. About 400 discriminating public procurement
policies were implemented since 2009. Public procurement localisation restrictions are the second
most often applied non-tariff barrier, with over 360 implemented restrictions. Public procurement
preference margins and access do play minor roles, with less than thirty applied measures each.
Non-tariff related import and export policies define the most diverse category of intervention types
that can be applied. This is not surprising as direct border controls are also most easily to distinguish.
Export taxes have been increasingly introduced over the past years, as well as trade finance measures.
According to GTA data, a large amount of trade finance measures stems from governments’ import-
export banks that find creative ways to subsidies their domestic exporters to the disadvantage of
other competing foreign exporters in the destination markets (Evenett and Fritz (2017), p.40). About
180 export tax changes and trade finance policies were implemented since 2009. Other common
import and export controls are specific trade bans, tax based export incentives or import licensing
agreements. The increasing focus on export incentives might reflect the strategy of governments to
help companies to increase market shares not only domestically, but also abroad (Evenett and Fritz
(2017), p.15). In this sense, non-tariff barriers are not necessarily protectionist but rather represent
unfair trade policies.
Contrary to data on non-tariff barriers provided by other sources, the GTA database records only
very few SPS and TBT measures. Only 12 SPS and 10 TBT measures have been implemented
that were protectionist. This could mainly stem from the fact that other sources like the WTO do
not distinguish between non-tariff barriers and non-tariff measures. Different to non-tariff barriers,
non-tariff measures do not necessarily have a protectionist character, but could also liberalize trade.
Especially for SPS and TBT measures it is unclear whether a trade supporting or trade hampering
effect is expected. This difference can explain the very small amount of SPS and TBT measures
recorded in the GTA database.
The usage of capital controls and exchange rate policies has been negligible compared to other
protectionist instruments. The GTA database recorded only four competitive devaluations and six
price stabilizing policies. However, it is important to note that only counts of implemented measures
are reported. Counts of implemented policies give a good overview on how many different types of
non-tariff barriers are used by the governments worldwide. Still, counts do not provide an indication
of the actual trade impact of each measure. A competitive devaluation e.g. of a national currency
that affects all industries and trading partners equally is very much likely to have a larger protectionist
effect than a subsidy provided to only one specific company in one specific industry.
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Table 1: Types of Protectionist Policies
Tariff changes
Tariff changes
Trade defense measures
Trade defense measures
Anti-circumvention
Anti-dumping
Anti-subsidy
Safeguard
Non-tariff barriers
Import controls Localisation policy
Import ban Local operations
Import incentive Local sourcing
Import licensing requirement Localisation incentive
Import monitoring
Import quota Capital controls and exchange rate policy
Import tariff quota Competitive depreciation
Import-related non-tariff measure, nes Price stabilisation
Internal taxation of imports
Trade balancing measure Other instruments
Trade payment measure Instrument unclear
Sanitary and phytosanitary measure
State aid and subsidies Technical barrier to trade
Bailout (capital injection or equity participation)
Financial assistance in foreign market Export controls
Financial grant (not included in estimation sample, only descriptives)
In-kind grant Export subsidy
Interest payment subsidy Other export incentive
Loan guarantee Tax-based export incentive
Production subsidy Trade finance
State aid, nes Export ban
State loan Export licensing requirement
Tax or social insurance relief Export quota
Export tax
Public procurement policy Export-related non-tariff measure, nes
Public procurement access
Public procurement localisation
Public procurement preference margin
11
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Figure 6: Number of Implemented NTBs, by Type (2009-2017)
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Figure 7: Continued: Number of Implemented NTBs, by Type (2009-2017)
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4.2 Non-Tariff Barriers as Means to Restrict Trade: Differences across
Countries
The implementation of non-tariff barriers substantially varies across countries. The United States
implemented by far the largest number of non-tariff barriers. With close to 800 non-tariff barriers the
US government implemented twice as much protectionist policies as the Indian government, which
ranks second (see Table 9 in the appendix, for a complete list of NTBs in each country). The two
BRICS economies, India and Russia rank second and third among the countries that implemented
the most non-tariff barriers, with 310 and 204 implemented non-tariff barriers, respectively. Larger
European economies like Germany, the United Kingdom and France implemented between 50 and 100
non-tariff barriers. Which is only about one tenth of the amount of non-tariff barriers implemented
by the United States. Saudi-Arabia, Indonesia and Belarus are also among the top 10 imposing
countries. China, as the world’s largest trading economy and often criticized for its unfair trade
practices, ranks 9th, with close to 100 interventions implemented. The world map in Figure 8 shows
how the use of non-tariff barriers is restricted to developed and developing economies. Non-tariff
barriers hardly play any role for African countries.5
What makes the United States in terms of non-tariff barriers the by far most protectionist country?
Besides political motives that are difficult to be identified there might be technical reasons, in the
way how non-tariff barriers are identified. On the one hand, the observed differences in observed
NTB measures could be driven by the tendency of the US government to announce each policy
5Table 11 lists the top 10 NTB implementing and affected countries.
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Figure 8: Number of NTBs Imposed by Country (2009-2017)
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Source: Global trade alert database
Figure 9: Share of NTBs Implemented by the United States, by Different Types of
NTBs (2009-2017)
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separately, which leads to over-reporting within the GTA database compared to other countries that
announce policies in bundles. On the other hand, Figure 9 shows that the United States has a very
different pattern of types of non-tariff barriers it uses compared to other countries. The United States
made extensive use of discriminatory state aid measures and subsidies as well as public procurement
policies. It accounted for more than 70% of all worldwide implemented public procurement policies
and about 25% of all subsidies and state aid barriers.
SPS and TBT measures do not play a role in the United State’s protectionist profile. Generally, the
comparison across countries depicts that the use of instruments is diverse. India for example mostly
applied discriminatory import and export policies and localization policies. In contrast to the United
States, public procurement and state aid were not outstandingly more often applied by India than
by other countries.
Figure 10: Types of NTBs Implemented, Percentage Share by Income Level of Countries
(2009-2017)
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Source: Global trade alert database. Income level classification according to World Bank 2016
The usage of non-tariff barriers is highly correlated with the income level of an economy. High income
countries appear to use non-tariff barriers more often than low or middle income countries. Despite
the difference in the number of non-tariff barriers implemented, the relative importance of non-tariff
barriers compared to traditional trade defense measures or tariff increases varies across income levels.
This finding is not surprising. Especially large economies that adopted all WTO regulations face
little scope for tariff increases within the regulatory framework. The increasing implementation of
non-tariff barriers relative to tariff increases might reflect how high income economies substitute
towards other instruments to protect their economy. For high income countries, the share of non-
tariff barriers of all implemented protectionist is around 50% (see figure 10). Tariffs account only for
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a small proportion of all implemented protectionist policies. In contrast, low income countries tend
to use tariffs rather than non-tariff barriers to protect their economies. Since 2011, more than 80%
of all protectionist policies implemented by low income countries were increases in import tariffs.
Non of the low income countries implemented any trade defense measure.6 This could be explained
by the fact that imposing trade defense measures is costly, as the country has to file a lawsuit at
the WTO and provide all necessary documents. An interesting pattern shows up in the development
in upper middle income countries. In 2009 non-tariff barriers and tariff changes were equally often
implemented. Since then, the development diverged and non-tariff barriers account for more than
50% of all protectionist policies, while the share of tariff changes dropped to about 10% in 2016.
4.3 Targets of Protectionism: Differences Across Countries
Figure 11: Number of Times a Country is Affected by Implemented NTBs (2009-2017)
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Source: Global trade alert database
Turning to the targets of protectionism, Germany and China are the two economies that are most
often likely to be affected by an implemented non-tariff barrier. German exporters were affected by
2,000, Chinese firms by 1,700 non-tariff barriers between 2009 and 2017. It is not surprising that
the two largest trading economies rank first and second. The GTA data is based on an estimation
procedure that relies on past trade flows to predict, which countries are likely to be affected by the
newly implemented protectionist interventions. Therefore, countries that trade larger volumes in a
broad range of products have a much higher likelihood of being affected than countries, that trade
only very few products at small scale. The world map in Figure 11 illustrates how often each country
was likely to be affected by a non-tariff barrier between 2009 and mid-2017.
6Note however that according to the GTA data there have been only about 70 interventions by low income
countries and more than 5,500 interventions by high income countries
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Most protectionist interventions of high income countries affect other high income countries. Figure
12 plots the amount of implemented non-tariff barriers by income levels of implementing and affected
countries. Non-tariff barriers of high income countries rarely affect low income countries. Vice versa,
though at a much lower scale, non-tariff barriers of low income countries affect high income countries
more often than low income countries. Again, this is not surprising due to the estimation procedure
applied to identify, which trading partners are most likely affected.
Figure 12: Number of Implemented NTBs, by Income Levels of Countries (2009-2016)
Source: Global trade alert database. Symbol size is proportional to protectionist measures implemented.
4.4 Targets of Protectionism: Differences across Sectors
There are a few product groups that exhibit extensive protectionism.7 As one would expect, prod-
ucts from sectors that exhibit problems of overcapacity are most often targeted by protectionist
policies. This holds for products of iron and steel, which lead to ranking of products that are most
often targeted by protectionist policies (Figure 13). Surprisingly, this effect is not only driven by
trade defense instruments such as anti-dumping. Instead, non-tariff barriers contribute most to the
over 800 interventions targeted at these products. Other fabricated metal products rank second
among the products most often targeted by protectionism. This product group contains products of
aluminium - an industry that also faces worldwide overcapacity. Figure 13 shows that there is large
variation in the types of protectionism applied across products. Products of electrical energy are
for instance most often and nearly only targeted by non-tariff barriers.Trade defense measures are
7The product classification follows the Central Product Classification (CPC) three-digit classification scheme of
the Untied Nations.
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Figure 13: Number of Protectionist Interventions, by Type and Sector (2009-2017)0 200 400 600 800Products of iron or steelOther fabricated metal productsDomestic appliances and parts thereofot???????or vehicles, trailers and semi−trailers; parts ??? accessories Electrical energyBasic iron and steelBearings, gears, gearing and driving elements, and parts thereofStructural metal products and parts thereofBasic organic chemicalsOther general−purpose machinery and parts thereof Non−tariff barriers Trade defenseTariff changes
Source: Global trade alert database
mainly concentrated in product groups of iron and steel, as well as basic organic chemicals and other
fabricated metal products. Applied tariff changes still seem to play a role in the automotive industry.
In contrast to findings from the WTO, which finds that non-tariff measures are more prevalent in
the agriculture sector than in the manufacturing sector, there are no agricultural products among
the top-10 most often targeted products (WTO (2012), p.136).
5 The Effect of Non-Tariff Barriers on Trade
As illustrated by the descriptive data, indirect protectionism through non-tariff barriers is on the rise.
How do these barriers affect trade flows? Two what extend do non-tariff barriers reduce bilateral
trade. In the following sections we present empirical estimations which aim at disentangling trade
effects caused by different types of non-tariff barriers.
5.1 The Gravity Model
The presented estimations are based on a structural gravity equation with tariffs pooled across
different products following Yotov et al. (2016). To identify the effect of non-tariff barriers on
trade, we exploit the fact that for each implemented protectionist measure the GTA database has
information about the detailed type of policy measure, trading partners that are most likely affected,
products that are affected (at CPC three-digit product level) and the year of implementation. This
information is used to construct dummies and counts for different types of protectionist policies. In
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the baseline specification we distinguish two groups of protectionist policies: trade defense measures
and non-tariff barriers. In the second specification we split non-tariff barriers into four subgroups: (1)
import controls, (2) state aid and subsidy measures, (3) public procurement and localisation policies
and (4) other non-tariff barriers, which include SPS, TBT and capital controls. See Table 2 for an
overview of instruments included. Dummies take the value 1, if at least one protectionist policy is in
place between two trading partners at a specific product line at time t. It is zero otherwise. Count
variables count the number of active protectionist polices between two trading partners that target
a specific product. The baseline estimation equation has the following form:
Ln(Xijkt) = β1PROTijkt−1+β2ln(1+tariffijkt−1)+ExpFEikt+ImpFEjkt+pairijk+ijkt, (1)
where Xijkt are bilateral imports at the product level, PROTijkt−1 includes either the dummies or
counts of the analysed protectionist policies, tariffs are included as ln(1 + tariffijkt−1). All policy
variables are lagged by one year. ExpFEikt and ImpFEjkt are vectors of export and importer-
product-time fixed effects, pairijk a vector of time invariant country-product pair fixed effects, and
ijkt is a non-idiosyncratic stochastic error term.
The exporter-product time fixed effects account for all outward multilateral resistance. Outward
multilateral resistance can be interpreted as exporter i’s market access, which is determined by
economic size and trade costs. Respectively, inward multilateral resistance reflects importer j’s
market access and is accounted for by the importer-product time fixed effects. We include directional
fixed effects at product level, as it is very likely that market access varies across products. Including
country-product pair fixed effects absorbs all time invariant trade costs, such as distance, common
language or shared border. It is assumed that all trade costs, which vary between country pairs over
time and across products are either tariffs or the protectionist policies. We include six time periods
from 2010 to 2015.
All explanatory variables are lagged by one year for two reasons: Firstly, non-tariff barriers and trade
defense instruments are often implemented in reaction to an increase in imports due to price dumping
or other trade practices that are perceived as unfair. As we only have yearly trade data, we cannot
control for the exact date of implementation. This might lead to upward biased estimates, which is
caused by an increase in trade prior to the implementation of protectionist policies. Secondly, it is
reasonable to assume that intermediate goods do not react immediately to changes in trade costs
(Ghodsi et al. (2017)). Using lags ensures that we account for changes in trade, which do not follow
immediately, but after some time of adaptation.
Given this identification strategy, the estimated coefficient of the protectionist dummy can be inter-
preted as the average change in bilateral yearly-imports at product level caused by the implementation
of at least one protectionist policy. If counts of protectionist polices are used, this interpretation
changes to the average change in bilateral imports caused by the implementation of one additional
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protectionist policy.
5.2 Data
All data on non-tariff barriers comes from the GTA database. For the estimation we exclude any
outward measures and focus on inward policies only. This means that we include measures that
are implemented by the importing country and which hit imports from the affected country into
the implementing country. We continue to focus on trade in goods and exclude services from our
analysis. The panel is constructed using the date of implementation and date of removal as start and
end periods, respectively. Observations that did not at least affect one trading partner are excluded.
This was the case for 0.8% of all recorded measures.
Data on bilateral imports is retrieved from BACI, a world trade database developed by Centre
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) based on United Nations (UN)
Comtrade trade data. All trade flows are reported in thousands of US-Dollars in current value at
HS6 product level using the HS92 classification. We aggregated trade flows to the CPC three-digit
product classification in order to merge the data with the non-tariff barriers information.
Data on applied tariffs at HS6 product level originated from TRAINS and the WTO’s Integrated Data
Base (IDB). As tariff data from TRAINS and IDB is incomplete we used interpolated tariffs to cover
all product lines. The most-favoured nation tariff is used as the applied tariff, if there is either no
preferential trade agreement between two countries, nor a tariff according to the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP). In all other cases the preferential tariff is used as the applied tariff. Similar to
imports, tariffs were aggregated to the CPC three-digit product classification by calculating simple
averages. The presented results don’t change if trade weighted tariffs are used.
Our dataset covers bilateral trade data for 152 importers and 152 exporters for the years 2010
to 2015. We include only countries that were members of the WTO prior to 2009, due to data
availability reasons. The dataset distinguishes 177 products according to the CPC three-digit product
code. 23.5% of all products face zero tariffs. The average applied tariff is 8%. At least one non-tariff
barriers was imposed on 2.45% of all traded products. In most cases, trade flows are only distorted
by one non-tariff barrier.
In order to validate the use of importer-product-time fixed effects, we used the ratio-method applied
by Henn and McDonald (2014). Theoretically variation among exporters is not given for behind-
the-border measures, as behind-the-border measures affect all exporters equally. Without variation
across exporters, importer-product-time fixed effect would absorb all variation and lead to biased
estimates. For each dependent variable we calculate the ratio of non-zero observation within each
importer-product-year combination. If this ratio equals one, all exporters are affected and no variation
is left after controlling with fixed effects. However, for all dependent variable, the average ratio does
not exceed 0.2, with standard deviations ranging between 0.01 and 0.09. Including importer-fixed
20
Hidden Protectionism ifo Institute
effects is therefore valid. Variation among exporters, even for behind the border measures, is caused
by construction of the GTA dataset. As it is estimated based on past trade flows to identify which
trading partners are likely to be affected by a protectionist measure.
5.3 Empirical Estimation Results
Table 2: Overview of Explanatory Variables
Tariff changes
Trade defense measures
Non-tariff barriers (NTB)
• Import controls
• State aid and subsidies
• Public procurement localisation policies
• Others (includes capital controls, SPS, TBT and other n.e.s)
Estimation results using the OLS estimator are reported in Table 3. We report results using dummies
and counts of non-tariff barriers as explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the log of
imports in thousand US-Dollars. We control for tariffs and implemented trade defense measures to
account for all unilateral trade policies, which could simultaneously affect trade flows. We report
all results first for the aggregate measure of non-tariff barriers and then split non-tariff barriers into
four different groups to disentangle effects for different types of non-tariff barriers (see Table 2 for
an overview). In addition, industry and region specific effects are analysed. Across all specification
importer-product-time, exporter-product-time and country-pair-product fixed effects are included.
Standard errors are clustered at country-pair-product level. In total 4,405,016 observations are
included in the estimation (Table 13 gives an overview of the NTB measures in the used sample).
All country-product-pairs, which have zero or missing trade flows are dropped from the analysis, if
the OLS estimator is used. Thus, we focus on the intensive margin of trade only. While we control
for tariffs in all our regressions, we abstain from reporting estimated coefficients. The reason is that
a quantitative analysis of the estimated trade elasticities is limited, as variation across tariffs in our
within-estimation is small.
5.3.1 Empirical Estimation Results: Average Effects
Across all our specifications we find that trade decreases, if protectionist measures are implemented.
It holds that non-tariff barriers have on average a stronger negative effect on bilateral trade flows
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Table 3: Estimation Results: OLS Using Dummies and Counts
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of imports in thousand USD Dummies Dummies Counts Counts
Trade defense measures -0.114*** -0.111*** -0.0439*** -0.0412***
(0.0175) (0.0175) (0.00957) (0.00956)
Non-tariff barriers -0.127*** -0.00519***
(0.00761) (0.00131)
Import controls -0.117*** -0.0714***
(0.0129) (0.00862)
State aid and subsidies -0.0559*** -0.0490***
(0.0105) (0.00789)
Public procurement/localisation policies -0.183*** -0.00148
(0.0142) (0.00135)
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls) -0.109*** -0.104***
(0.0248) (0.0245)
Observations 4,405,016 4,405,016 4,405,016 4,405,016
R-squared 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913
All estimations include importer-product-time, exporter-product-time and country-pair-product fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at country-pair-product level. All regressions include lagged tariffs as a control. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Except
for tariffs all explanatory variables can enter the regression either as dummies or counts. The first two estimations account for non-tariff
barriers with dummies, while the last two estimations estimate the effect of a change in the number of implemented non-tariff barriers
(counts). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
than trade defense measures.Trade defense measures can be anti-dumping, countervailing duties and
safeguards.
According to our most general specification in column 1 of Table 3 with dummies as indicators of
non-tariff barriers, bilateral imports decreased in response to the implementation of at least one
non-tariff barrier by 11.9%.8 This effect is significant at the 1% level. Trade defense measures
have a similar large effect on bilateral trade flows. On average yearly-bilateral trade decreased by
10.8%, if at least one trade defense measure is implemented. Note from the descriptives (Table
13) that only in 0.3% of all cases at least one trade defense measure is in place. In 2.6% of all
country-product-time pairs at least one non-tariff barrier is implemented. Tariffs have a negative
and significant effect on imports across all specification.9 We estimate an average trade elasticity of
0.2 across all products and countries (not shown but included in all estimations. Extended results
are available upon request). This is compartively low. Head and Mayer (2015) compared estimated
trade elasticities from 447 studies, where all studies used country fixed-effects estimation methods.
The mean trade elasticity across these studies was 4.12, with a standard deviation twice as high as
8All percentage changes are calculated as follows: Percentage change = (eβNTB − 1) ∗ 100
9For interested reader we are happy to provide the full estimation results with further regressors upon request.
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the mean. Hinting at the fact that trade elasticities can vary tremendously.
As our descriptive analysis showed, the types of applied non-tariff barriers are diverse. Therefore we
disaggregate our measure for non-tariff barriers to examine in more detail, which type of measures
causes the largest reduction in imports. We distinguish four groups: (1) import controls, (2) state
aid and subsidies, (3) public procurement and localisation policies and (4) other non-tariff barriers,
which include SPS and TBT measures as well as capital controls and exchange rate policies (see
Table 2).
Results for disaggregated non-tariff barrier effects are reported in Table 3, column 2. The estimated
coefficients are highly significant and negative for all types of non-tariff barriers. The parameters
vary between -0.06 and -0.18. Public procurement and localisation policies seem to have on average
the strongest negative effect on bilateral imports. On average bilateral imports decreased by 16.7%,
if at least one measures was implemented. In contrast, state aid and subsidies have the smallest
negative impact on imports (-0.0559). Direct import controls, SPS, TBT and capital controls seem
to on average decrease trade by 10%.
We also run our estimation using counts of implemented measures instead of dummies. The interpre-
tation of the parameters changes. It now indicates the average effect on yearly-bilateral trade flows
at product level caused by one additional policy implementation. All estimated coefficients remain
significant, with the exception of the parameter for public procurement and localisation policies.
The estimated coefficient for non-tariff barriers is much smaller when using counts and not dum-
mies. This effect seems to be mostly driven by direct border measures and public procurement and
localisation policies, where each measure on average seems to have much weaker effects on trade.
The coefficient for both import controls and trade defense measures decreases trade by 0.04 and
0.07, respectively. The estimated parameter for public procurement and localisation policies shrinks
tremendously in size and does not remain significant. This can be caused by the fact, that there
are some country-product pairs, that exhibit an outstanding number of measures implemented (ex-
ceeding 100). One additional measure therefore only has very limited additional impact on imports
(small marginal effect).
We repeat all estimations and control additionally for unilateral trade policies imposed by the exporter
and use zero-trade weighted tariffs instead of simple averages. The coefficients of interest do not
significantly change. We therefore abstain from including those in each estimation and assume that
the effects of protectionism are well identified across all presented specifications. We use specification
(1) and (2) as our baseline specification in the following regressions.
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Table 4: Estimation Results: by Industry
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumer Consumer
Log of imports in thousand USD Agriculture Agriculture Resources Resources goods goods
Trade defense measures -0.0986 -0.0967 0.0668 0.0696 -0.0385 -0.0342
(0.132) (0.132) (0.331) (0.331) (0.0422) (0.0422)
Non-tariff barriers -0.0874*** -0.300*** -0.104***
(0.0233) (0.0820) (0.0156)
Import controls -0.0932** -0.0469 -0.137***
(0.0396) (0.159) (0.0252)
State aid and subsidies -0.0571** -0.393*** -0.0437*
(0.0267) (0.145) (0.0224)
Public procurement/localisation policies -0.108* -0.347* -0.172***
(0.0632) (0.179) (0.0313)
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls) -0.204** -0.363** -0.0520
(0.103) (0.158) (0.0490)
Observations 316,622 316,622 156,045 156,045 1,014,512 1,014,512
R-squared 0.913 0.913 0.912 0.912 0.917 0.917
Dependent Variable (7) (8) (9) (10)
Transportable Transportable Metals and Metals and
Log of imports in thousand USD goods goods machinery equipement machinery equipement
Trade defense measures -0.177*** -0.174*** -0.0668** -0.0688**
(0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0312) (0.0312)
Non-tariff barriers -0.107*** -0.153***
(0.0151) (0.0120)
Import controls -0.112*** -0.117***
(0.0266) (0.0207)
State aid and subsidies -0.0310 -0.0641***
(0.0232) (0.0160)
Public procurement/localisation policies -0.156*** -0.202***
(0.0293) (0.0199)
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls) -0.0951** -0.121***
(0.0403) (0.0446)
Observations 1,330,214 1,330,214 1,587,623 1,587,623
R-squared 0.919 0.919 0.904 0.904
All estimations include importer-product-time, exporter-product-time and country-pair-product fixed effects. All regressions include lagged
tariffs as a control. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at country-pair-product level. All explanatory variables are lagged
by one year. Except for tariffs, all explanatory variables enter the regression as dummies. Sectors are classified according to the CPC
1-digit code. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5.3.2 Estimation Results: by Industry
We distinguish five industries, according to the 1-digit CPC product classification. These are: (1)
Agriculture, forestry and fishery products; (2) Ores and minerals; electricity, gas and water; (3)
Food products, beverages and tobacco; textiles, apparel and leather products; (4) Other trans-
portable goods, except metal products, machinery and equipment; (5) Metal products, machinery
and equipment.
The degree to which the implementation of non-tariff barriers on average decreases trade flows
varies across industries. Across all industries negative effects on trade caused by non-tariff barriers
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are larger than negative effects caused by trade defense measures (mainly anti-dumping).
Looking at the aggregate measure of non-tariff barriers, trade in the resource sector (including ores,
minerals, electricity, gas and water) is most heavily affected by non-tariff barriers. If at least one
non-tariff barrier is implemented, trade on average decreased by 25.9%. With the exception of direct
import controls, all types of non-tariff barriers equally contribute to this strong negative trade effect
(parameter estimates varying from -0.35 to -0.39). The strong negative non-tariff barrier effects
appears to be driven by a small number of cases (bilateral relations) as can be seen from Table 15 in
the appendix. Only 1.2% of all country-product-year pairs within this industry observe at least one
non-tariff barrier initiation. This is the smallest share across all industries. Metals and machinery and
equipment products exhibit the most country-product-time pairs that have at least one non-tariff
barrier implemented (3.4%). In this sector, the implementation of at least one non-tariff barriers on
average leads to a decrease in bilateral imports by 14.2%. In contrast to the resource sector, state
aid and subsidies are less responsible for a trade slowdown while import controls are the major driver
of the observed negative effect.
Within the two sectors of consumer goods and transportable goods, non-tariff barriers have very
similar effects on trade flows. On average bilateral imports decreased by about 10% if at least one
non-tariff barrier was implemented in either sector. The negative effects on trade are mainly caused
by public procurement and localisation policies (-0.17 and -0.16 for consumer and transportable
goods, respectively) and import controls (-0.14 and -0.11, respectively). If agricultural products are
exposed to at least one non-tariff barrier, bilateral imports decrease on average by 8.42%. This is
the smallest effect observed across all industries.
5.3.3 Estimation Results: by Income Group
While a similar share of imports is affected by non-tariff barriers in high and upper-middle income
countries (2.8 and 2.6%, respectively), the estimated coefficient of non-tariff barriers is twice as
large for upper-middle income countries (-0.19) than for high income countries (-0.09) (see Table
5, column 1 and 3). This indicates, that if at least one non-tariff barrier is implemented, imports in
upper-middle income countries react stronger to this additional trade barriers than in high income
countries. In both income groups public procurement and localisation policies affected imports most
strongly. In high income countries the implementation of import controls additionally imposed on
average large reductions in imports. In upper-middle income countries in contrast, other non-tariff
barriers (SPS, TBT and capital controls) as well as state aid and subsidies had significantly negative
effects on imports, if implemented.
Within the group of low income countries trade protectionism based on non-tariff barriers only plays
a minor role. Probably driven by the fact that trade in general is low. Low income countries
implemented no trade defense measures and the usage of non-tariff barriers is also restricted to
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Table 5: Estimation Results: by Income Groups
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of imports in thousand USD High High Upper middle Upper middle
Trade defense measures -0.106*** -0.103*** -0.119*** -0.115***
(0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0362) (0.0363)
Non-tariff barriers -0.0931*** -0.187***
(0.00987) (0.0164)
Import controls -0.131*** -0.0580**
(0.0178) (0.0263)
State aid and subsidies -0.0442*** -0.114***
(0.0118) (0.0424)
Public procurement/localisation policies -0.150*** -0.240***
(0.0228) (0.0223)
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls) -0.214 -0.133***
(0.161) (0.0409)
Observations 2,187,396 2,187,396 955,199 955,199
R-squared 0.929 0.929 0.916 0.916
Dependent Variable (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of imports in thousand USD Lower middle Lower middle Low Low
Trade defense measures -0.0497 -0.0491
(0.0474) (0.0474)
Non-tariff barriers -0.142*** -0.0525
(0.0181) (0.172)
Import controls -0.0832*** -0.0593
(0.0296) (0.175)
State aid and subsidies -0.117***
(0.0281)
Public procurement/localisation policies -0.147***
(0.0326)
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls) -0.113*** 0.262
(0.0317) (0.475)
Observations 846,018 846,018 334,582 334,582
R-squared 0.898 0.898 0.851 0.851
All estimations include importer-product-time, exporter-product-time and country-pair-product fixed effects. All regressions include lagged
tariffs as a control. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at country-pair-product level. All explanatory variables are lagged
by one year. Except for tariffs, all explanatory variables enter the regression as dummies. Income groups are defined according to the
World Bank income classification. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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import controls, which does not significantly affected trade flows.
Comparing the effects of non-tariff barriers and trade defense measures across income groups, the
estimation results underline the argument that non-tariff barriers are at least as important protec-
tionist instruments as trade defense measures. Trade defense measures turn out to only negatively
impact imports into upper-middle and high income countries.
5.3.4 Estimation Results: by Country Groups
In the following we distinguish effects of non-tariff barriers in four groups of countries, namely the
G20 economies, the European Union (EU), the United States and the Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa (BRICS) economies.10 Looking just at the descriptives (see Table 17 in the appendix),
the high share of non-tariff barriers applied by the United States and the BRICS economies stands
out. 17.2% of imports into the United States faced at least one non-tariff barrier - mainly driven by
public procurement and localisation policies. In comparison, only 2.6% of imports into the EU are
affected by at least on non-tariff barriers. Across the BRICS economies, on average 8.6% of imports
were affected by non-tariff barriers (see Table 17.
Non-tariff barriers seem to affect imports more strongly into the United States and the G20 economies
(see estimation results in Tables 6). Although the United States imposed by far the biggest number
of subsidies, state aid, public procurement and localisation policy measures, imports into the United
States do not seem to be outstandingly affected by these instruments. Compared for example with
the EU or the G20 economies, public procurement and localisation policies have only a small effect
on trade. Outstanding is the large impact of trade defense measures on imports into the EU. Imports
into the EU on average decrease by -18.9 %, if at least one trade defense measure is implemented.
Among all G20 economies, the effect of trade defense measures on trade is only half as strong as in
the EU. These cross country comparison illustrates a large heterogeneity with significant difference
across countries, particularly, how non-tariff barriers materialize. With these results it becomes clear
that a purely descriptive analysis would lead to wrong conclusions on how non-tariff barriers affect
international trade. Only analysing the amount of implemented measures is not sufficient, as the
effects on trade can vary substantial across countries and sectors.
5.4 Discussion of the Results in Comparison
There are several existing studies that have attempted to identify the trade reducing effect of non-
tariff measures. The WTO summarizes for example in its report on non-tariff barriers that NTB
are twice as restrictive as tariff measures (WTO (2012), p.136). Also Kee et al. (2009) and Nikita
10Russia is excluded from the analysis, due to data availability reasons, as it was not member of the WTO prior to
2009. In case of the EU we exclude Croatia.
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Table 6: Estimation Results: by Country Groups
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of imports in thousand USD G20 G20 EU w/o Croatia EU w/o Croatia
Trade defense measures -0.109*** -0.106*** -0.197*** -0.192***
(0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0477) (0.0477)
Non-tariff barriers -0.120*** -0.0605***
(0.00991) (0.0139)
Import controls -0.0691*** -0.152***
(0.0165) (0.0283)
State aid and subsidies -0.0572*** -0.0137
(0.0133) (0.0151)
Public procurement/localisation policies -0.172*** -0.833***
(0.0155) (0.176)
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls) -0.217** -0.0668
(0.0860) (0.180)
Observations 989,044 989,044 1,128,986 1,128,986
R-squared 0.939 0.939 0.934 0.934
Dependent Variable (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of imports in thousand USD USA USA BRICS BRICS
Trade defense measures -0.0443 -0.0396 -0.0443 -0.0410
(0.0537) (0.0538) (0.0463) (0.0463)
Non-tariff barriers -0.116*** -0.0554***
(0.0289) (0.0215)
Import controls -0.0685 0.0814**
(0.0722) (0.0347)
State aid and subsidies -0.107*** -0.00721
(0.0413) (0.0323)
Public procurement/localisation policies -0.0983*** -0.110***
(0.0291) (0.0261)
Other NTBs (SPS, TBT, capital controls) -0.242
(0.174)
Observations 81,140 81,140 214,109 214,109
R-squared 0.935 0.935 0.911 0.911
ImpExpProd FE YES YES YES YES
ImpProdYear FE YES YES YES YES
ExpProdYear FE NO NO NO NO
Estimations for the United States and BRICS exclude exporter-product-time fixed effects due to missing variation across importers. All
regressions include lagged tariffs as a control. Standard errors, reported in brackets, are clustered at country-pair-product level. All
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Except for tariffs, all explanatory variables enter the regression as dummies. Data for the
EU is not aggregated, all European countries enter the estimation separately. Russia is excluded from the estimations, also for the BRICS
economies, as it was not member of the WTO prior to 2009.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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and Hoekman (2011) both find that non-tariff barriers are generally more restrictive than tariffs.
In addition, they also find that non-tariff barriers affect developed countries more than developing
countries and that non-tariff barriers have stronger restrictive effects in the agricultural sector than in
manufacturing. However, a problem that arises in a comparison with the previous estimations is that
most other studies use data on non-tariff barriers based on notifications to the WTO, which does not
distinguish between trade liberalising and protectionist impacts of non-tariff measures. Therefore,
the underlying data in the mentioned WTO study or academic contributions like the one by Ghodsi
et al. (2017) look very different to the used GTA data base in this study. I.e. most non-tariff barriers
are SPS or TBT measures in the agriculture sector. Our data set contains only a handful of SPS
and TBT measures and only 0.7% of non-tariff barriers are targeted at agricultural products. This
can explain substantial differences in the presented results compared to other studies.
A related study by Henn and McDonald (2014) also uses GTA data. However, their study was
conducted in 2010 and uses data on non-tariff barriers only from late 2008 until end 2009. The
study concludes that border controls (defined as non-tariff and tariff measures) reduce trade by about
8%. For behind the border measures the analysis identifies negative estimates of similar magnitude
(about 7%) . Trade defense measures also have the strongest impact in terms of percentage changes
on trade (17%).
Furthermore, while the underlying study follows the recommendation of the gravity literature where
possible some critical aspects are worth mentioning. Non-tariff barriers are presented as bilateral
measures. As mentioned, the bilateral structure is derived by estimating which trading partner would
most likely be affected by a respective measure. Clearly, this approach creates some concern, as
technically most non-tariff barriers are likely to affect all trading partners of a country equally. The
present bilateral structure is hence constructed and makes strong assumptions. Moreover, in case of
the EU e.g. intra-EU trade has been included, which may result in a downward bias. Finally, the way
how the GTA data is collected, namely, based on policy announcements differing across countries
raises also concerns, that might bias the presented effects.
However, given the comprehensively updated GTA data, this study is the first that presents an
empirical estimation based on a structural gravity specification. Empirical results on how non-tariff
barriers shape international trade are scarce due to the difficult data collection. Without doubt
there is a lot to investigate along the mentioned lines. Methodologically, it is worth to consider
a restructured GTA data in which the constructed bilateral variation is given up for behind the
border measures. Moreover, estimating effects based on Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods is
also something to be taken into account in the future given the mentioned data peculiarities.
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6 Impact of Non-Tariff Barriers on Global Trade Slow-
down
The main objective of the presented econometric analysis is to quantify the impact of non-tariff
measures on international trade. As it has been illustrated, non-tariff barriers turn out to have a
significant protective impact on imports. Based on the estimated average effect it is possible to
assess how much of the recently observed global trade slowdown may be explained by the increasing
usage of non-tariff barriers.
Figure 14: NTBs Contribution to Global Trade Slowdown
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
World trade volume (in current Trillion USD) Predicted trade
Missing trade 
16% 
84% 
Other factors
NTB related trade reductions
We use a very ad-hoc approximation to calculate the share of trade reduction that can be attributed
to recently implemented non-tariff barriers following the academic literature in which a potential
trade level has been predicted.For example, in "The Global Trade Slowdown - A new normal?"
Constantinescu, Mattoo and Ruta from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank provide predictions for global trade growth depending on whether the trade slowdown persists
or not (Hoekman (2015), p.47). They use estimated world trade elasticities for the period from
2000 until 2014 to predict average growth rates of global trade, as they assume that these trade
elasticities reflect a possible trade development that would have excluded trade reducing phenomena.
According to their estimates global trade in 2015 would have been growing by 4.4%. Based on 2014
merchandise trade data from the World Bank, this would predict global imports of 19.9 trillion
US Dollars. As a numerical simulation, we assume that 19.9 US Dollars represents the highest
possible aggregate world trade volume that would have been achievable without any factors that
caused the global trade slowdown. This assumption leads to a gap between potential and actual
observed global trade of 3.2 trillion US Dollars for the year 2015. Given our prior estimation results,
that bilateral imports of specific products on average decreased by 11.9%, if at least one non-
tariff barrier is implemented, we predict from our sample with 152 countries, that non-tariff barriers
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cause aggregated trade to be lower by 3.07%. Therefore, we can infer, that non-tariff barriers are
responsible for about 16% of the missing global trade. This is based on the assumption that our
sample with 152 countries is representative for the sample used by Constantinescu et al. (2015).
Figure 14 visualizes this simple projection.
Table 7: Potential changes in nominal trade flows, by country (2015)
Germany EU-28 USA China
∆ Exports (billion USD) 43 170 48.5 73
∆ Imports (billion USD) 34 165 74.4 54
∆ Exports/GDP (%) 1.16 1.04 0.29 0.83
∆ Imports/GDP (%) 0.92 1.01 0.45 0.61
Source: UN Comtrade and own calculation.
Table 7 summarizes how imports and exports of Germany, the EU, China, and the USA would
be affected on average if the analyzed global non-tariff barriers were not in place. Accordingly,
Germany for example could realize additional exports worth around 43 billion USD and at the same
time imports would increase by around 34 billion USD. The US on the other hand could expect to
achieve a higher export volume of around 48 billion USD while imports are predicted to increase even
stronger reaching an additional volume of around 74.4 billion USD. The effects represent projections
based on partial estimation methods and it is most likely, that a general equilibrium analysis will
come to some modified results, due to changes in consumption and production adjustments along
the expected trade pattern changes. Still, the presented results illustrate that an elimination of
non-tariff barriers can have substantially different effects on the trade balances. Based on the most
recent data Germany would increase its trade surplus even more while the US can expect a further
widening of its already large trade deficit.
Table 8 illustrates how trade flows are expected to change along an elimination of non-tariff barriers
across the world. Again it becomes clear that some countries are predicted to experience an increase
in their trade surplus while others would import more than the expected additional exports. The
table also illustrates that the expected additional changes in trade flows vary significantly across
countries particularly with respect to the relative size expressed as GDP share. Accordingly, smaller
countries like Belgium or Slovakia turn out to be affect significantly stronger by NTBs than large
economies as for example the United Kingdom or Germany.11
11Table 18 presents expected average trade flow changes on the sectoral level for Germany, in case of a global
NTB elimination.
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Table 8: Potential changes in nominal trade flows in the EU, by country (2015)
Country Change of exports in Change of imports in Change of exports in Change of imports in
billion US-Dollar billion US-Dollar percent of GDP percent of GDP
Austria 4.69 4.76 1.14% 1.16%
Belgium 12.85 11.93 2.54% 2.36%
Bulgaria 0.83 0.94 1.55% 1.75%
Croatia 0.41 0.66 0.71% 1.13%
Cyprus 0.06 0.18 0.27% 0.79%
Czechia 5.08 4.53 2.30% 2.05%
Denmark 3.06 2.74 0.92% 0.83%
Estonia 0.45 0.51 1.93% 2.17%
Finland 1.93 1.94 0.78% 0.78%
France 15.95 18.12 0.58% 0.66%
Germany 42.91 34.02 1.16% 0.92%
Greece 0.91 1.52 0.37% 0.62%
Hungary 3.24 2.92 2.29% 2.06%
Ireland 4.03 2.50 1.55% 0.96%
Italy 14.76 13.22 0.72% 0.64%
Latvia 0.37 0.45 1.32% 1.58%
Lithuania 0.82 0.91 1.85% 2.05%
Luxembourg 0.41 0.62 0.67% 1.02%
Malta 0.13 0.22 1.23% 2.12%
Netherlands 15.30 13.67 1.77% 1.58%
Poland 6.28 6.10 1.13% 1.10%
Portugal 1.78 2.15 0.79% 0.95%
Romania 1.96 2.25 1.04% 1.19%
Slovakia 2.42 2.35 2.41% 2.34%
Slovenia 0.86 0.83 1.74% 1.69%
Spain 8.98 9.82 0.63% 0.69%
Sweden 4.52 4.45 0.84% 0.83%
United Kingdom 15.06 20.27 0.56% 0.76%
Source: UN Comtrade, WDI and own calculation.
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7 Conclusion
Building on the recently released Global Trade Alert data this study illustrates how trade protection in
form of non-tariff barriers has emerged over the past years. A major focus is put on illustrating what
type of non-tariff barriers have been implemented by policy makers to reduce import competition.
Moreover, a further important contribution of the study is the empirical evaluation of how non-tariff
barriers impact international trade. Contrary to the fears of different stakeholders import tariffs have
not been used in a significant manner to protect domestic markets from foreign competition since the
financial crisis in 2008, even though the political pressure in many countries created a large incentive
for a protective trade policy. Unfortunately, this result does not mean that countries abstained from
protectionism. The presented GTA data illustrates that while tariffs were not used on a large scale to
reduce imports at the same time a strong increase in non-tariff barriers has taken place. Since 2009,
only 20% of all implemented protectionist interventions can be attributed to an increase in tariffs. In
contrast, non-tariff barriers accounted for around 55% of all implemented protectionist interventions.
The usage of non-tariff barriers increased steadily relative to trade defense measures. While in 2010
only 54% of all protectionist interventions were non-tariff barriers the usage of non-tariff barriers
increased to 61% in 2016.
It turns out that the implementation of non-tariff barriers is highly correlated with the income level of
an economy. High income countries appear to use non-tariff barriers more often than low or middle
income countries. Despite the difference in the number of non-tariff barriers implemented, the
relative importance of non-tariff barriers compared to tariffs as protectionist instruments also varies
across income levels. Equally, the usage of non-tariff barriers substantially varies across countries.
The United States implemented by far the largest number of non-tariff barriers. With close to 800
non-tariff barriers the US government implemented twice as much protectionist policies as the Indian
government, which ranks second. The two BRICS economies, India and Russia rank second and third
among the countries that implemented the most non-tariff barriers, with 310 and 204 implemented
measures, respectively. Larger European economies like Germany, the United Kingdom and France
implemented between 50 and 100 non-tariff barriers, which is only about one tenth of the amount
of non-tariff barriers implemented by the United States. Subsidies and state aid measures make up
the largest number of implemented non-tariff barriers in the considered database. These measures
are mainly driven by the extensive provision of financial grants provided to domestic companies that
discriminate against foreign competitors. Over 500 such financial grants have been provided in the
period between 2009 and 2017. Other important subsidies and state aid instruments have been state
loans, bailouts and taxes or social-insurance reliefs. Localisation requirements in public procurement
are the second most often applied non-tariff barriers, with over 360 implemented restrictions.
Not only have non-tariff barriers been increasingly applied as trade restricting measures, but they
also have had a significant import reducing effect. On average bilateral imports decrease in response
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to the implementation of at least one non-tariff barrier by 12%. Similarly, on average yearly-
bilateral trade decrease by around 11%, if at least one trade defense measure, which include anti-
dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures is implemented. However, non-tariff barriers are used
substantially more often than trade defense measures. The effect of non-tariff barriers on imports
turns out to be very divers across different industries, countries with different income levels and
individual countries. A main reason for this heterogeneity can be found in the strong variation on
how often and which type of non-tariff barriers are implemented in the different groups.
Finally, the study illustrates that the identification of non-tariff barriers remains a major challenges.
Contrary to data on non-tariff barriers provided by other sources, the GTA database for example
records only very few SPS and TBT measures. One reason for this pattern may stem from the
fact that other sources like the WTO do not distinguish between non-tariff barriers and non-tariff
measures. Different to non-tariff barriers, non-tariff measures do not necessarily have a protectionist
character, but could also liberalize trade.
With all these open challenges the study has a clear message. Protectionism has been on the rise
not in form of tariffs but with trade policy instruments which are less harmonized within the WTO.
The underlying analysis illustrates that non-tariff barriers may be responsible for about 16% of the
observed global trade slowdown. Clearly, making such a projection remains difficult as the prediction
of a potential trade level is complicated. Depending on the assumptions made the results may
change significantly. Still, the presented example calculation hints on a crucial role of non-tariff
barriers for the observed global trade slowdown.
With these results it becomes clear that the world needs to take decisive steps to prevent the
further rise of non-tariff barriers. A right step had been taken with free trade agreements such as
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or the Trans-Pacific Partnership in which the
reduction and harmonization of non-tariff barriers was a major aim. Reviving these initiatives should
be a major aim in the near future.
Equally, there is a clear message for the multilateral trading system. The world has been very
successful in regulating import tariffs but there are new protectionist measures which require in-
ternational coordination. These challenges give the WTO an important task, namely bringing the
member countries together and achieving the same success as in the case of tariffs.
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Table 9: Number of Implemented NTBs, by Country
Number of Number of Number of Number of
implemented times country is implemented times country is
Country NTB’s affected by NTB Country NTB’s affected by NTB
Afghanistan 3 74 DPR Korea 0 126
Albania 0 351 DR Congo 0 64
Algeria 6 207 Ecuador 11 276
American Samoa 0 29 Egypt 35 769
Andorra 0 45 El Salvador 0 150
Angola 1 104 Equatorial Guinea 0 51
Anguilla 0 19 Eritrea 0 26
Antigua & Barbuda 0 58 Estonia 27 633
Argentina 105 910 Ethiopia 3 155
Armenia 1 140 Fiji 0 80
Aruba 0 50 Finland 44 1191
Australia 16 1269 France 100 1851
Austria 48 1427 French Polynesia 0 40
Azerbaijan 1 236 Gabon 0 54
Bahamas 0 152 Gambia 1 27
Bahrain 0 438 Georgia 0 454
Bangladesh 9 312 Germany 131 2002
Barbados 0 80 Ghana 5 142
Belarus 116 698 Greece 43 866
Belgium 55 1608 Grenada 0 17
Belize 0 106 Guam 0 10
Benin 0 67 Guatemala 1 445
Bermuda na 108 Guinea 0 59
Bhutan 0 38 Guinea-Bissau 0 10
Bolivia 4 149 Guyana 0 79
Bosnia & Herzegovina 0 204 Haiti 0 61
Botswana 0 82 Honduras 1 197
Brazil 113 1333 Hong Kong 1 1114
Brunei Darussalam 0 87 Hungary 35 1205
Bulgaria 36 749 Iceland 2 332
Burkina Faso 0 62 India 312 1351
Burundi 0 30 Indonesia 127 1056
Cambodia 2 224 Iran 1 288
Cameroon 0 123 Iraq 0 68
Canada 44 1853 Ireland 47 1043
Cape Verde 0 43 Israel 2 962
Cayman Islands na 66 Italy 110 1871
Central African Republic na 33 Ivory Coast 0 149
Chad 0 39 Jamaica 1 106
Chile 3 797 Japan 96 1569
China 112 1909 Jordan 0 228
Chinese Taipei 0 93 Kazakhstan 69 628
Colombia 18 639 Kenya 6 171
Comoros 0 26 Kiribati 0 10
Congo 0 85 Kuwait 1 213
Costa Rica 0 534 Kyrgyzstan 3 151
Croatia 22 545 Lao 0 95
Cuba 0 123 Latvia 35 636
Cyprus 26 330 Lebanon 0 215
Czechia 46 1276 Lesotho 0 61
Denmark 55 1262 Liberia 0 46
Djibouti 0 23 Libya 0 123
Dominica 0 35 Liechtenstein 0 15
Dominican Republic 3 499 Lithuania 38 658
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Table 10: Number of Implemented NTBs, by Country (continued)
Number of Number of Number of Number of
implemented times country is implemented times country is
Country NTB’s affected by NTB Country NTB’s affected by NTB
Luxembourg 15 738 Saint Lucia 0 27
Macao 0 1 Saint Pierre & Miquelon 0 4
Macedonia 2 378 Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 0 24
Madagascar 0 137 Samoa 0 37
Malawi 0 77 San Marino 0 41
Malaysia 25 1198 Sao Tome & Principe 0 5
Maldives 0 54 Saudi Arabia 151 743
Mali 0 48 Senegal 1 147
Malta 14 278 Serbia 6 369
Marshall Islands 0 23 Seychelles 0 83
Mauritania 1 65 Sierra Leone 2 52
Mauritius 0 191 Singapore 0 1173
Mayotte 0 6 Slovakia 32 971
Mexico 19 1201 Slovenia 40 770
Micronesia 0 9 Solomon Islands 0 22
Mongolia 0 122 Somalia 0 23
Montenegro 0 58 South Africa 34 1043
Montserrat 0 3 South Sudan 0 1
Morocco 5 383 Spain 75 1623
Mozambique 0 201 Sri Lanka 8 293
Myanmar 2 134 State of Palestine 0 58
Namibia 4 96 Suriname 0 102
Nauru 0 1 Swaziland 0 131
Nepal 0 135 Sweden 47 1497
Netherlands 53 1597 Switzerland 3 1376
Netherlands Antilles 0 30 Syria 1 167
New Caledonia 0 326 Tajikistan 1 109
New Zealand 2 857 Tanzania 4 168
Nicaragua 0 134 Thailand 6 1376
Niger 0 67 Timor-Leste 0 20
Nigeria 17 248 Togo 1 102
Niue 0 9 Tokelau 0 19
Norway 1 986 Tonga 0 2
Oman 1 522 Trinidad & Tobago 0 399
Pakistan 36 644 Tunisia 0 464
Palau 0 4 Turkey 24 1336
Panama 2 302 Turkmenistan 0 130
Papua New Guinea 0 98 Turks & Caicos Islands 0 12
Paraguay 5 197 Tuvalu 0 9
Peru 1 452 Uganda 3 125
Philippines 1 892 Ukraine 33 1006
Pitcairn 0 3 United Arab Emirates 0 957
Poland 82 1363 United Kingdom 93 1792
Portugal 47 1070 United States of America 796 1747
Qatar 0 210 Uruguay 22 377
Republic of Korea 23 1517 Uzbekistan 1 235
Republic of Moldova 4 231 Vanuatu 0 31
Republic of the Sudan 2 102 Venezuela 15 512
Romania 37 1025 Vietnam 22 1041
Russia 250 1200 Western Sahara 0 3
Rwanda 1 47 Yemen 0 127
Saint Helena 0 24 Zambia 0 186
Saint Kitts & Nevis 0 39 Zimbabwe 5 353
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Table 11: Top 10 NTB implementing and affected countries (2009-2017)
Top 10 NTB implementing countries Top 10 NTB affected countries
Number of Number of
implemented times country is
Country NTB’s Country affected by NTB’s
United States of America 796 Germany 2002
India 312 China 1909
Russia 250 Italy 1871
Saudi Arabia 151 Canada 1853
Germany 131 France 1851
Indonesia 127 United Kingdom 1792
Belarus 116 United States of America 1747
Brazil 113 Spain 1623
China 112 Belgium 1608
Italy 110 Netherlands 1597
Source: Global Trade Alert, own calculation.
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Table 12: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Imports in thousand USD 19725.189 317480.117 1 97142264 4,405,016
Tariff (simple average, in percent) 6.28 20.066 0 2314.286 4,405,016
Trade defense 0.003 0.053 0 1 4,405,016
NTB 0.026 0.159 0 1 4,405,016
Import controls 0.008 0.09 0 1 4,405,016
State aid & subsidies 0.009 0.094 0 1 4,405,016
Other 0.003 0.057 0 1 4,405,016
PP & localisation 0.008 0.092 0 1 4,405,016
40
Hidden Protectionism ifo Institute
Table 13: Descriptives: NTBs Identified by Dummies
Count Percent
Trade defense
0 4.392.584 99,7
1 12.432 0,3
NTB
0 4.291.291 97,4
1 113.725 2,6
Import controls
0 4.368.891 99,2
1 36.125 0,8
State aid & subsidies
0 4.365.324 99,1
1 39.692 0,9
PP & localisation
0 4.367.799 99,2
1 37.217 0,8
Other
0 4.390.576 99,7
1 14.440 0,3
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Table 14: Summary Statistics, by Industry
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Agriculture
Imports in thousand USD 8163.734 105814.921 1 17147846 316622
Tariff (simple average, in percent) 6.577 13.8 0 1429.455 316622
Resources
Imports in thousand USD 59140.013 947791.372 1 97142264 156045
Tariff (simple average, in percent) 2.747 5.422 0 107.357 156045
Consumer goods
Imports in thousand USD 9737.931 137238.545 1 34205232 1014512
Tariff (simple average, in percent) 11.269 39.143 0 2314.286 1014512
Transportable goods
Imports in thousand USD 17123.145 181391.63 1 21199932 1330214
Tariff (simple average, in percent) 5.18 6.919 0 263.913 1330214
Metals, machinery and equipment
Imports in thousand USD 26719.036 386309.176 1 70696192 1587623
Tariff (simple average, in percent) 4.302 5.916 0 167.535 1587623
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Table 15: Descriptives for Estimations by Industry
Consumer
Agriculture Resources goods
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent
Trade defense
0 316.550 100 156.037 100 1.012.474 99,8
1 72 0 8 0 2.038 0,2
NTB
0 308.650 97,5 154.216 98,8 987.777 97,4
1 7.972 2,5 1.829 1,2 26.735 2,6
Import controls
0 313.628 99,1 155.089 99,4 1.000.743 98,6
1 2.994 0,9 956 0,6 13.769 1,4
State aid & subsidies
0 312.880 98,8 155.546 99,7 1.007.978 99,4
1 3.742 1,2 499 0,3 6.534 0,6
PP & localisation
0 315.320 99,6 155.899 99,9 1.008.839 99,4
1 1.302 0,4 146 0,1 5.673 0,6
Other
0 315.913 99,8 155.745 99,8 1.011.556 99,7
1 709 0,2 300 0,2 2.956 0,3
Transportable Metals and
goods machinery equipment
Count Percent Count Percent
Trade defense
0 1.324.278 99,6 1.583.245 99,7
1 5.936 0,4 4.378 0,3
NTB
0 1.307.595 98,3 1.533.053 96,6
1 22.619 1,7 54.570 3,4
Import controls
0 1.324.410 99,6 1.575.021 99,2
1 5.804 0,4 12.602 0,8
State aid & subsidies
0 1.321.868 99,4 1.567.052 98,7
1 8.346 0,6 20.571 1,3
PP & localisation
0 1.324.859 99,6 1.562.882 98,4
1 5.355 0,4 24.741 1,6
Other
0 1.325.627 99,7 1.581.735 99,6
1 4.587 0,3 5.888 0,4
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Table 16: Descriptives for Estimations by Income Groups
High Upper middle Lower middle Low
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent
Trade defense
0 2.180.440 99,7 951.866 99,7 843.889 99,7
1 6.956 0,3 3.333 0,3 2.129 0,3 334.582 100
NTB
0 2.126.935 97,2 930.168 97,4 818.420 96,7 334.360 99,9
1 60.461 2,8 25.031 2,6 27.598 3,3 222 0,1
Import controls
0 2.166.303 99 949.861 99,4 836.704 98,9 334.365 99,9
1 21.093 1 5.338 0,6 9.314 1,1 217 0,1
State aid & subsidies
0 2.157.598 98,6 951.217 99,6 840.159 99,3 334.582 100
1 29.798 1,4 3.982 0,4 5.859 0,7
PP & localisation
0 2.172.983 99,3 942.108 98,6 836.478 98,9 334.582 100
1 14.413 0,7 13.091 1,4 9.540 1,1
Other
0 2.187.065 100 949.192 99,4 837.950 99 334.577 100
1 331 0 6.007 0,6 8.068 1 5 0
Table 17: Descriptives for Estimations by Country Group
G20 EU USA BRICS
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent
Trade defense
0 982.090 99,3 1.123.943 99,6 80.610 99,3 158.476 98,3
1 6.954 0,7 5.043 0,4 530 0,7 2.730 1,7
NTB
0 913.786 92,4 1.100.064 97,4 67.172 82,8 144.185 89,4
1 75.258 7,6 28.922 2,6 13.968 17,2 17.021 10,6
Import controls
0 965.383 97,6 1.117.152 99 80.766 99,5 157.295 97,6
1 23.661 2,4 11.834 1 374 0,5 3.911 2,4
State aid & subsidies
0 960.385 97,1 1.111.157 98,4 77.310 95,3 156.809 97,3
1 28.659 2,9 17.829 1,6 3.830 4,7 4.397 2,7
PP & localisation
0 955.425 96,6 1.128.797 100 68.558 84,5 149.014 92,4
1 33.619 3,4 189 0 12.582 15,5 12.192 7,6
Other
0 988.406 99,9 1.128.849 100 81.140 100 161.113 99,9
1 638 0,1 137 0 0 0 93 0,1
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